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The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of trust in the unobservable decision-making 
process of lead investors and follow-on investors in the specific context of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns. 
Design/methodology/approach 
This work employs a case study approach. This research conducts a three-year inductive field 
study of Chinese equity crowdfunding - AngelCrunch. It gathered both campaign and platform-
level data from the selected case covering a period of seven years from 2011 to 2018. The 
dataset used for this study includes the characteristics of 189 online campaigns, 25 face-to-face 
interviews with the platform managers, early-stage investors and entrepreneurs, first-hand 
observations, and quarterly reports on online campaigns supplemented with informal 
interviews with the author for the reports.
Findings
The findings from this study provide early insights onto the unobservable decision-making 
process of ECF investors. It demonstrates how lead investors build competence and relational 
trust on which they rely for making an early pledge. Lead investors initially work on selective 
signalling information and establish early competence trust in the founding entrepreneur to 
select ventures for due diligence. They then depend on physical interactions with the 
entrepreneur as a powerful tool of performing thorough due diligence for building competence 
and relational trust. In contrast, follow-on investors differ from lead investors in the process of 
building trust for decision-making. They consider the credibility of lead investors and their 
pledge as additional information useful to develop their confidence of making the final 
decisions. Furthermore, this work uncovers the role of ECF platforms in facilitating the process 
of building interpersonal trust for the decision-making, with challenges to maintain the notion 
of platforms in raising a small amount of capital from a large crowd.   
Research limitations/implications
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This study is constrained by the limited scale of qualitative elements available. The findings of 
the study have implications for platform managers, investors, and policy makers.
Originality/value 
Building on entrepreneurial finance and trust theory, this work demonstrates how lead investors 
build competence and relational trust on which they rely to make an early pledge in the context 
of ECF. The perception of a lead investor and the commitment together with the selective and 
formative information by the entrepreneur/s are key in follow-on investors’ decision-making. 
This study uncovers that crowdfunding enables additional and valuable information to be 
assessed by crowd investors to manage extreme risk and uncertainty occurred in early-stage 
investments. This work also demonstrates that virtual world has its limitations to build 
interpersonal trust for managing extreme risk.
Key words: entrepreneurial finance, equity crowdfunding, early-stage investors, competence 
and relational trust, China    
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Introduction 
Crowdfunding is a global phenomenon and operates in almost every country in the world (Rau, 
2017; Bernardino and Santos, 2016). It has experienced demonstrably rapid growth in the 
number of platforms and amounts of capital raised globally, since emerging in 2011 (Bruton et 
al., 2015). The development of equity crowdfunding (ECF) platforms offers an important 
source of finance for early-stage innovative ventures (Grilli et al., 2018; Lin and Viswanathan, 
2013). This innovative approach entails an attempt to raise a small amount of capital from a 
“crowd” in exchange for business shares of a firm through an online platform (Belleflamme et 
al. 2014; Ahlers et al. 2015). The financial innovation has created new channels for prospective 
investors to invest in new and early-stage ventures and in a simplified way (Harrison, 2013). It 
also lowers the cost of entrepreneurial finance (Massolutions, 2012; Harrison, 2013; Baldock 
and Mason, 2015). Prior studies have acknowledged a mix of professional and amateur 
investors active on ECF platform (Vismara, 2018; Astebro et al. 2017). Literature on ECF 
suggests that crowdfunding investors are inadequately equipped to overcome problems 
associated with information asymmetry and perceived uncertainties. Amateur investors 
typically lack the experience and capability to perform extensive due diligence (Ahlers et al. 
2015; Agrawal et al. 2015). Bernstein et al. (2017) found that existing lead investors seem to 
have little influence on follow-on investors’ screen decisions, whilst other studies suggested 
that follow-on investors herd after professional investors (Astebro et al. 2017). Such 
inconsistent findings, based mainly on evidence recorded in a platform, suggest a need to 
investigate the unobservable decision-making processes of ECF investors and gather in-depth 
evidence from multiple sources. 
Literature on the increasing popularity of ECF has primarily examined the campaign-level 
determinants and based entirely on Western countries like the UK, USA, Australia, and some 
European countries (Ahlers et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2017; Block et al., 2018; Vismara, 2016; 
Vismara, 2018;). Consequently, a wide range of determinants have been identified: expertise 
and experience possessed by founding entrepreneurs (Ahlers et al., 2015), their social networks 
(Vismara, 2016), equity retention (Vismara, 2016), updates (Block et al., 2018), and behaviours 
of professional investors (Vismara, 2018; Bernstein at al., 2017). These studies have employed 
a signalling theory to examine what signals from the entrepreneurs and venture determine the 
likelihood of online campaign success (Ahlers et al., 2015), with the exception of Vismara 
(2018) and Astebro et al. (2017). The literature are currently dominated by quantitative studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is that Brown et al., (2019) have employed a 
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qualitative approach, focusing on the role of both personal and business networks in the equity 
crowdfunding process in the UK. Traditionally, early-stage investors (i.e. venture capitalists 
(VCs) and business angels (BAs)) rely on both competence and relational trust built through 
executing due diligence to arrive at their investment decisions (Cumming et al., 2015; 
Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Hsu, 2004; Polzin et al., 2018). Competence trust, in this study, 
refers to an assessment of whether an entrepreneurial team is capable of the business success 
indicated by performance metrics (Butler, 1991; Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995). 
Relational trust, in this work, refers to the feeling of early-stage investors that an 
entrepreneurial team wants to do well for themselves and investors (Mayer et al., 1995), and 
the establishment of effective relationships between investors and entrepreneurs (Uzzi, 1997 
and 1999). The investment process, through which investors interact with the entrepreneurs, 
helps build both competence and relational trust for investors’ decision-making (Hain et al., 
2016). Given the importance of interpersonal trust in early-stage investments (Bammens and 
Collewaert, 2014), this work attempts to explore questions: how lead investors build 
interpersonal trust for making an early pledge in the context of a ECF campaign, and how the 
perceptions and attributes of lead investors play a role in the decision-making process of 
follow-on investors.  
Approximately eight years after the establishment of ECF platforms, it is now appropriate to 
address important practical and theoretical questions above (Griffin 2013; Cholakova and 
Clarysee, 2015; McKenny et al., 2017). The development of ECF platforms improves 
operational models and practices to enhance online campaign success. Improved operational 
models help overcome ECF-based problems: trust building, ownership complexity, supporting 
and monitoring the investee ventures. Such models also help follow-on investors learn essential 
skills of evaluating the venture quality and funding potential. An investor-led model, therefore, 
is utilised by ECF platforms like AngelList -US, AngelCrunch - China, and SyndicateRoom - 
UK. This operational model first encourages lead investors to make an early pledge that is a 
sufficient amount to the capital required before raising funds from follow-on investors. By so 
doing, it expects that follow-on investors cherish the commitments and expertise of the lead 
investors. Knowing how lead investors make a pledge is important to understand the 
investment behaviour and process. 
This study examines AngelCrunch operated in China that represents the main country for CF 
in the world, indicated by the number of platforms and the amount of capital raised therein 
(Rau, 2107). Studying ECF in countries like China would add to the increasing popularity of 
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the emerging ECF literature since so far much attention has been given to developed countries 
like the UK, USA, Australia, and some European countries (Vismara, 2016; Vismara, 2018; 
Ahlers et al., 2015; Bernstein et al., 2017; Block et al., 2017). Moreover, prior studies have yet 
to use trust theory to examine the decision-making process in the specific context of a campaign. 
China, where trust based on personal network ties remains useful and important in governing 
economic exchanges (Burt and Batjargal, 2019), is a fascinating context to study the trust role 
in the process. 
This study conducted a three-year inductive field study, and gathered both campaign and 
platform-level data from multiple sources. This research started with quarterly reports on online 
campaigns by the studied platform supplemented with informal interviews with the authors, 
followed by gathering campaign-level data, focusing on the characteristics of 189 campaigns 
including the human capital of entrepreneurs, start-up ideas, and the characteristics of lead 
investors. It also successfully conducted 25 face-to-face interviews with the platform managers, 
early-stage investors and entrepreneurs, covering a period of seven years from the platform’s 
establishment in 2011 to January 2018. Simultaneously, first-hand observations on offline 
speed-dating matching entrepreneurs with early-stage investors and subsequent meetings 
between lead investors and entrepreneurs were conducted. 
As well as being one of the first studies on ECF in China, this study contributes to 
entrepreneurial finance and emerging crowdfunding literature in several ways. First, it provides 
early insights onto the unobservable decision-making process of ECF investors. Building on 
entrepreneurial finance and trust theory, this work demonstrates how lead investors build 
competence and relational trust on which they rely for making an early pledge, and provides 
insights into the behaviours of follow-on investors in the decision-making process. This work 
also uncovers the role of ECF platforms in facilitating the process of building interpersonal 
trust for the decision-making, with challenges to maintain the notion of platforms in raising a 
small amount of capital from a large crowd. Finally, literature on ECF is profoundly dominated 
by quantitative studies and based on the data recorded in a platform; this work therefore makes 
a methodological contribution by using in-depth empirical evidence from multiple sources to 
examine the trust role and processual elements.  
Contextual Literature 
Equity Crowdfunding 
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Literature on ECF has examined the determinants of campaign success and outcomes, 
providing some understanding of the relationships between factors and campaign success. 
Based on a sample of 104 projects from October 2006 to October 2011 obtained from the 
Australian Small Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB), Ahlers et al. (2015) suggested the 
probability of fundraising success being associated with risk factors, declared exit intentions, 
and the top management team (e.g., size or level of education). A recent study based on a 
sample of 271 projects listed on UK platforms Crowdcube and Seedrs in the period 2011-2014 
found that both equity retention and entrepreneurs having a large social network enhanced the 
probability of campaign success (Vismara, 2016). Another determinant of the success of ECF 
campaigns is information cascades among individual investors that play an essential role in 
attracting follow-on investors and triggering social contagion (Vismara, 2018), suggesting both 
the commitment of entrepreneurs of a project and the reputation and opinion of existing visible 
investors determining the success of ECF campaigns. 
A few of studies have then examined the campaign process. A research by Block et al. (2018), 
based on 71 funding campaigns on two German ECF  portals, suggested that posting an update 
has a significant positive effect on the number of investments made by the crowd and the 
investment amount collected by the start-ups. Brown et al. (2019) have found that, based on 
in-depth empirical data from entrepreneurs of funded start-ups, ECF as a process linked to 
networking is a “relational” form of entrepreneurial finance. Although these works have 
provided some understanding of the dynamic processes, a question raised is whether there is a 
role by the platforms in the decision-making process (McKenny et al., 2017). 
ECF’s early evolution has seen that investor-led operation model has evolved to signal 
additional information about lead investors to follow-on investors in the belief that follow-on 
investors cherish the commitment and expertise of lead investors.  Lead investors differ from 
follow-on investors in several ways. First, lead investors are likely to be experienced angel 
investors and VCs, whilst follow-on investors are likely amateur ones lacking the expertise and 
skills required to assess the project’s quality and funding potential (Vismara, 2018).  Second, 
lead investors make a pledge before follow-on investors do so. Third, lead investors need to 
provide a sufficient amount of capital; whist follow-on investors are entitled to provide a small 
amount. Finally, lead investors are typically responsible for monitoring the investee venture at 
the post-investment. 
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The pledging and reputations of a lead investor may encourage follow-on investors to interpret 
the selective information displayed in the campaign documents more positively, building up 
competence trust (Fydrych et al., 2014; Agrawal et al., 2013; Hemingway, 2013; Vass, 2013; 
Burtch et al., 2013; Greiner and Wang, 2010). Lead investors who come to an ECF platform 
usually have links to other investors (e.g. Seedrs links to Passion Capital seed VC and 
Seedcamp accelerator in the UK; Crowdcube’s link with HALO angel network in Ireland). 
Using a randomized field experiment, Bernstein et al. (2017) found that the average investor 
responds strongly to information about the founding team, but hardly responded to existing 
lead investors in their screening of decisions. In contrast, Drover et al. (2017), focusing on 
VCs’ screening decisions, suggested that the attributes of angels and crowds produce highly 
influential effects. The inconsistent empirical findings suggest a need to investigate the 
decision-making process of investors and trust-related factors for campaign success within an 
ECF platform (Brown et al., 2019). 
Trust theory and early-stage investments
It has been widely acknowledged that trust is crucial in the context of early-stage equity 
financing (Bammens and Collewaert, 2014; Hain et al., 2016). Scholars studying economic 
activities associated with information asymmetries and perceived uncertainty find trust to be 
particularly useful in explaining investors’ behaviours and in shaping financial exchanges 
(McEvily et al., 2003; Williamson, 1993). Trust is a primary means of addressing information 
asymmetries that exist between investors and entrepreneurs relating to the growth potential of 
a business (Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Hsu, 2004). More importantly, it is particularly 
crucial to cope with perceived uncertainties associated with: (i) unobservable demands; (ii) 
unpredictable markets; and (iii) unknown cooperative manner (Uzzi, 1997, 1999; Bammen and 
Colliwaert, 2014). Trusting entrepreneurs’ capabilities to respond to changes in the market 
therefore becomes key to overcoming a lack of insightful and observable information needed 
to address perceived risk and uncertainty (Shane and Cable, 2002). Early-stage investors also 
consider entrepreneurs’ cooperation – such as in agreeing to take management advice from 
lead investors and their non-executive director appointments - when making their decisions 
(Uzzi, 1997, 1999; Mason and Harrison, 2004; Baldock et al., 2015). Therefore, the likelihood 
of providing equity finance to early-stage ventures is enhanced when an investor trusts the 
entrepreneur(s). For projects that have passed through due diligence, successfully obtaining 
risk capital from early-stage investors depends heavily on entrepreneurs’ efforts to demonstrate 
their trustworthiness (Mason and Harrison, 2015). Literature on ECF has assumed that early-
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stage investors rely on selective information about entrepreneurs and the venture quality, and 
the wisdom of a crowd to make their decisions. Missing from the literature is whether and how 
lead investors who make an early pledge build trust in entrepreneurs, which may then influence 
follow-on investors’ decision-making.
Trust refers to a psychological state based primarily on a confident expectation and belief that 
another party will act in a certain manner, and the trusting party is willing to expose itself to 
risk arising from the actions of the trusted party (Mayer et al., 1995; Paul and McDaniel, 2004). 
Two types of interpersonal trust, namely competence trust and relational trust, are particularly 
important in the context of early-stage investments. Competence trust requires an assessment 
of whether the other party is capable of doing what it says it will do (Butler, 1991; Butler and 
Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995). Early-stage investors are usually experienced and 
knowledgeable of products/services and the market(s) in which they are interested (Xiao, 2011; 
Xiao and North, 2012). The expertise and skills possessed by such investors enable them to a 
certain extent evaluate both the potential growth of a market and the demand for the 
product/services offered by a firm (Mason, 2009). With an emphasis on pre start-ups and start-
ups, angel investors attach more importance to the ability of an entrepreneur and/or 
entrepreneurial team members to operate and grow the business (Mason and Harrison, 2000). 
Relational trust refers to the feeling or belief of the trusting party that the trusted party wants 
to succeed in a cooperative manner (Mayer et al., 1995). Early-stage investors need to feel that 
entrepreneurs will act as anticipated or behave cooperatively regardless of an investor’s ability 
to monitor and control the investee business. Relational trust enables both early-stage investors 
and entrepreneurs to move towards a more symmetric information base, thereby reducing the 
perceived uncertainty of investment (Hain et al., 2016; Mishra and Zachary, 2014). Conversely, 
entrepreneurs may need to feel that investors are able to provide smart hands-on business 
assistance required when needed and/or anticipated. Face-to-face contacts through the 
investment process is a typical means of developing the level of competence and relational 
trust required, influencing investment decisions and determining the possibility of obtaining 
equity finance (Xiao and North, 2012; Baldock and Mason, 2015; Mueller et al., 2012).
Operating in the virtual world might render face-to-face meetings, a typical means of 
developing both competence and relational trust in traditional equity finance, no longer realistic 
(Duarte et al., 2012; Mollick, 2013). Instead, such interactions are replaced by: (i) face-to-face 
online visual contacts; and (ii) selective information sending to the crowd (Ahlers et al., 2013; 
Ward and Ramachandra, 2010). It seems that, based primarily on observable information about 
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the entrepreneurs and business being limited, EFC investors have less means of assessing the 
determination, interpersonal dynamics, and trustworthiness of a founding entrepreneurial team. 
Moreover, online campaign periods are short, typically between 30 and 60 days (Massolutions, 
2012; Cumming and Zhang, 2016). 
Having discussed the importance of interpersonal trust in early-stage investments (Bammens 
and Collewaert, 2014), this study attempts to address the following questions:
(1) How do lead investors build interpersonal trust in the investment process for making an 
early pledge in the specific context of a campaign?
(2) How do follow-on investors differ from lead investors in terms of the trust role in the 
decision-making process? 
The case of AngelCrunch
This study focuses on AngelCrunch that was one of the first three ECF platforms established 
in 2011 in China. It is the fastest-growing ECF platform in China from its inception in 2011 
through rapid growth to slow down since late 2016, just like other Chinese major ECF 
platforms, in terms of numbers of projects and registered investors. By January 2017, on this 
platform 4,000 qualified investors meeting the platform’s criteria were registered. The full 
eligibility criteria include CNY 500,000 of annual total income, or CNY 1 million of savings, 
or CNY 2 million of market value of investment, or CNY 10 million of market value of estate 
properties; and professional/work experience due to which they are well aware of extreme risk 
undertaken. The qualified investors are institutional VCs, business angels, experienced 
entrepreneurs, and wealthy individuals with professional qualifications and relevant work 
experience. AngelCrunch had raised CNY 1 trillion for 230 new and early-stage venture 
investment projects (see Table 1) by August 2015, representing two-thirds of the CNY 1.54 
trillion for 333 projects raised by ECF platforms in China as a whole over the same period. 
However, like all of its competitors in China, it has subsequently experienced a slowdown in 
terms of the amounts of capital raised and the number of projects funded since early 2016. 
Additionally, the platform’s staff decreased from 97 in 2015 to 43 in early 2017. 
Table 1 about here
Research design  
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Data collection: This study explores how lead investors build competence and relational trust 
for the decision-making within an ECF platform. ECF platforms, acting as “orchestrators”, 
bring investors together with entrepreneurs (Brown at al., 2019). Therefore, a case study 
approach has been chosen as the primary method of data collection. Figure 1 shows the data 
used f r this study, which were collected from four main sources. First, it started with quarterly 
reports on AngelCrunch by Tech2IPO and annual reports on the overall development of 
China’s ECF platforms, supplemented with four informal interviews with the authors of those 
reports. Tech2IPO is a social media platform run by AngelCrunch, and its quarterly reports 
record the successful campaign characteristics and fundraising activities of the major ECF 
platforms, document events organised by platforms, and provide updates on the financial 
innovations. The four informal interviews with the authors of those reports covered unexpected 
practices found, askingn questions like why physical meetings between lead investors and 
entrepreneurs were organised, and why on average a considerable number of physical meetings 
actually occurred before a pledge is made.  
Figure 1 about here
Second, campaign-level evidence on the shared characteristics of successful campaigns was 
hand-collected through the platform’s website and cross-referenced by evidence from investee 
firms’ websites.  It is worth noting that campaign-level evidence was only available to the 
platform’s analysts and accredited investors. A research assistant supervised by the author 
successfully gathered 189 successful campaigns run from 2013 to late 2016. During this period, 
the investor-led model was formally operated on the platform. Given the focus of this study on 
exploring how lead investors build trust leading to an early pledge, the common characteristics 
of successful campaigns are valuable to know. It also gathered detailed evidence about 
entrepreneurs’ human capital (i.e. education, work experience, specific skills) and their 
business activities through each firm’s website in the same way that early-stage investors would 
likely do so. Coding of data collected was guided by literature on entrepreneurial finance and 
ECF. Such data included: education, subject disciplines, work experience of founding 
entrepreneurs, venture’s business activity and development stage, information about the lead 
investor if published, ratio of capital actually raised versus capital initially asked for, number 
of early-stage investors investing in a project, time frame, background of existing investors, 
and physical interactions between entrepreneurs and lead investors. 
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Third, in-depth information drawn from 25 face-to-face interviews with the platform 
management staff, lead investors and follow-on investors, and founding entrepreneurs was 
gathered, covering the period from the platform’s establishment in 2011 until January 2018. 
Amongst the 25 interviews conducted during a three-year period from 2015 to 2018, 16 
interviews were with senior platform managers, seven interviews were with investors including 
five with lead and two with follow-on investors, and two interviews were with entrepreneurs 
of the funded start-ups (see Figure 1). Two platform managers were interviewed multiple times, 
so the number of interviews was greater than the number of interviewees. Amongst 16 
interviews with platform managers, nine interviews were with platform project managers who 
worked with lead investors and entrepreneurs for the selected projects closely. For instance, 
those managers actively approached lead investors for briefing a selected project, coached the 
entrepreneurs for pitch, and arranged meetings for negotiating the deal. In-depth information 
they provided focused on the behaviours of lead investors in the decision-making processes, 
relating to trust building that lead investors relied on for making an early pledge. Three lists 
with open-ended questions were used to guide the interviews respectively, aimed at gathering 
insights into building competence and relational trust. The typical length of each interview was 
one hour. Interviews were digitally recorded, and transcribed, with findings double-checked 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). During the interviews with the platform managers, it covered 
issues such as why ECF in practice kept on changing over time, and how those changes 
influenced each investment processes and campaign success. For instance, the author asked 
questions like “tell me about a project that you as a project manager were fully involved in”, 
and encouraged them to share their experience of working with lead investors and 
entrepreneurs in the pledge decision-making processes. For lead investors, the author asked 
questions like “tell me the project that you as the lead investor invested in (did not invested 
in)” and “how did meeting the entrepreneurs help to make a pledge”. Interviews with 
entrepreneurs focused on the role of the interactions with the lead investors in making a pledge.
Finally, first-hand observations of lead investors and entrepreneurs in relation to an ECF 
campaign were collected. During the author’s visits in 2016, 2017 and 2018, the author 
attended offline speed-dating events and due diligence meetings about subsequent 
considerations between lead investors and entrepreneurs organised by the platform managers. 
The author spent many hours at AngelCrunch’s office, and observed the communications 
between platform project managers and entrepreneurs of the selected campaigns where 
platform project managers coached entrepreneurs on the business plan and pitch. The 
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observations allow the author to detect questions asked by lead investors and why such 
questions being asked in relation to the decision-making. These participant observations 
provides data on the role of “orchestrator” in helping build type of trust between lead investors 
and entrepreneurs. 
Data analysis: this work started the data analysis on the quarterly reports supplemented with 
in-depth empirical evidence from the initial informal interviews with the authors. The author 
focused on the evolution of the platform’s operational model as well as the organised historical 
online and offline events over time (Miles et al., 2013). It then moved on to review the 
campaign-level data, and close attention was drawn to what information published online drove 
lead investors to make a pledge and what information available to follow-on investors 
influenced their decisions. This research used literature on the determinants of ECF and 
evaluation criteria by angel investors as a theoretic basis to analyse the data. It aimed to explore 
what kind of published information that ECF investors relied on to build interpersonal trust 
with entrepreneurs for making a pledge. 
At the same time, this study analysed in-depth empirical evidence from the interviews and first-
hand observations. It began data analysis by iteratively coding all the interview transcripts and 
notes from observations, using literature on trust building and the decision processes as a 
theoretic basis. The author took notes when reading the transcripts and original notes from the 
observations, linking to the findings based on archival data and the campaign data. The coding 
often made the use of labels that were directly from the informant interviewees (e.g. ‘physical 
meetings asked by lead investors’, ‘invested in the entrepreneur/s rather than the venture’, ‘job 
change costs’, and ‘exploring the personality of entrepreneurs). The author sorted the 
comments into the emerging topical categories, and associated these categories with initial 
codes that addressed the main topic of interest in this study: how lead investors build 
interpersonal trust in the entrepreneur for making a pledge over the process within an ECF 
platform. The analysis involved an iterative approach of moving back and forth amongst data. 
As common themes began to develop, such as interpersonal trust in the entrepreneurs and 
business for making a pledge, the author used these themes to link any categories that were 
developed. This step enabled us to refine the coding scheme into more precise sub-themes. The 
author began to notice some codes related to concepts from prior literature, such as competence 
and relational trust as well as processual elements. The concepts emerged from the coding 
process helped to link the raw data to the description of the findings. Analysing the data led 
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this work to see the approach to the emerging investment process model for lead investors, 
differing from that for follow-on investors. Analysing the data also enabled this study to see 
how lead and follow-on investors were incorporated into a campaign.  
Findings
Operational model evolution
In order to understand investors building trust in the specific context of a campaign, this study  
first presents how the investor-led model operates. The operational model employed by 
AngelCrunch was evolved over time, with an early shift of the focus from bringing investors 
together with entrepreneurs to facilitating the campaign success and outcomes. It was not until 
2013 that the investor-led model was fully developed and operated in the platform, and this led 
to rapid growth for a period of three years from 2013 to late 2016, reflected by the amount of 
investment raised, the number of investors registered, and the number of projects registered. 
As Figure 2 shows, the model comprises five steps. First, entrepreneurs who attempt to raise 
ECF register their firms on the platform’s website. By August 2015, a total of 16,090 projects 
had been registered seeking to raise risk capital through the platform. Second, project managers 
from the platform initially select firms to be listed on the website to attract a lead investor’s 
pledge, following the selection criteria established by the platform. The selection of start-ups 
for a pledge is mainly based on: (i) industrial sectors like internet services and software services; 
and (ii) human capital possessed by the founding team members. As stated by the senior 
manager of AngelCrunch: “investors are encouraged by the success of companies like Uber, 
Airbnb, and others, and particularly interested in a high-tech version of an old-fashioned 
industry.” Table 2 shows the successful crowdfunding campaigns, broken down by the industry. 
Among the firms examined, 98% were engaged in the digitalising of traditional industry (i.e., 
leisure, education, food, law, health and care, automotive services, and photography). 
Figure 2 about here
A total of 4,928 ECF campaigns, representing 31% of applications, were posted to attract lead 
investors. ‘Lead investors’ refer to those with investment expertise pledging at least 30% of 
the capital required for progression to platform fundraising to follow-on investors. Campaign-
level data revealed that lead investors provided, on average, CNY 190,000 in investment capital. 
Lead investors were primarily sourced in three ways. First, the platform project managers 
approached experienced potential investors with preferred business activities (e.g. industry 
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activity, business development stage, location), based on their online platform profile. Second, 
entrepreneurs and investors communicated initially through workshops and speed-dating 
events organised by the platform. Finally, lead investors sought actively for firms pre-listed on 
the platform to invest. Firms that received a lead investor’s pledge of no less than 30% of the 
required capital progressed to raise the remaining funds from the follow-on investors over a 
promotional period of one calendar month. ‘Follow-on investors’ refer to individuals who are 
more likely amateur or less experienced investors, providing a relatively small amount of risk 
capital to young firms, and unlikely getting involved in monitoring or assisting the venture 
directly. Finally, the platform transferred the full amount of ECF to firms that obtained the 
required capital. Lead investors were then responsible for establishing an ‘investment firm’ and 
monitoring the venture once the campaign has raised capital successfully. 
Table 2 about here
Pledging of lead investors and competence and relational trust
The campaign-level data showed that lead investors were a mix of professional investors (e.g. 
venture capitalists and experienced angel investors, (Vismara, 2018)) and active businessman 
(e.g. experienced entrepreneurs and established companies). More specifically, amongst 103 
funded ventures with published lead investor information online, 89 lead investors were VCs, 
nine lead investors were experienced angel investors, and five lead investors were established 
companies. These professional lead investors not only had resources and expertise to perform 
extensive due diligence for making an early pledge but also took more responsibilities at post-
investment stage (e.g. monitoring and providing business assistance to the investee venture). 
Lead investors played a strong role in the decision-making processes, placing the importance 
of building trust in entrepreneurs. 
Selection process. Information that primarily signals the experience, expertise, and 
commitment of the founding entrepreneur/s and an underlying idea for a new business plays a 
crucial role in capturing an investor’s attentions (Bernstein et al., 2017). Our data showed that 
ventures selectively displayed detailed information on the level of human capital possessed by 
founding entrepreneur/s to build initial competence trust. Information containing high costs of 
changing a job or the reputational cost of failure within the professional network would sway 
both lead and follow-on investors. For instance, information like, the reputation of the 
universities where the founders undertook their academic degree(s) (e.g., 94% of founders 
obtained a first degree), well-known organisations where the founders have worked at, and the 
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specific work experience and expertise of the founders were commonly displayed online. 
Overall, 83 firms (44%) named and displayed the top tier universities where the founding 
entrepreneurs had obtained their degree(s). What constituted a “top-tier university” is like 
Beijing, Qing Hua and Fu Dan in China, and Columbia and Warwick overseas. In addition, 
152 firms (81% of successful campaigns examined) provided detailed information on their 
founders’ work experience, with 29% of founders having had project management experience 
at a well-known organisation, 27% possessing entrepreneurial skills and management 
experience, 22% with experience of R&D and developing new products, 15% with marketing 
experience, and 6% with financial management experience. A significant proportion of 
successful campaigns (83%) had been created by an entrepreneurial team, typically ranging 
from two to five founders (just 4% had more than five founders).  
Information on entrepreneur and the venture displayed online was important for lead investors 
to start-up for due diligence. As stated by one lead investor who has run software companies 
since the 1990s: “it was published information on the founding team that caught my eye in the 
early stage of the selection process.” A similar view was echoed by a platform manager: “The 
background of founding entrepreneurs is much more appealing to investors for passing 
through due diligence when a pre-start-up or start-up is being concerned. Figures about 
financial performance of a firm have become more important today than in the past since 
investors are now more interested in businesses with generated sales.”  It is essential for 
projects to provide information about the quality of an entrepreneurial team, enabling lead 
investors to feel that the founding team not only aligns with their motives but that they are also 
capable of growing the firm quickly. 
Figure 3 about here
Trust building and pledge: Figure 3 depicts that competence and relational trust building are 
relied upon by lead investors to make a pledge, and that competence trust and the behaviour of 
other investors are relied on by follow-on investors to make an offer. Prior research has 
acknowledged that online information has its limitations, and is often biased (Agrawal et al., 
2016). Recent studies have also found that updates posted during a campaign influence crowd 
participants and increase the chances of raising crowdfunds (Block et al., 2018). Given that 
lead investors pledge sufficient amounts of capital and work with the investee venture closely 
at the post-investment stage, performing extensive due diligence to build trust became 
necessary. Table 3 illustrates that lead investors want to test about whether entrepreneurs 1) 
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have the most essential skills required growing the venture fast and 2) can be trusted in terms 
of cooperative manners and interpersonal dynamics for a pledge. 
Our data showed that 57% of the funded projects had involved physical meetings between 
potential lead investors and entrepreneurs. In 2014 alone, amongst seven projects drawing 
attention from groups of investors, with a group size ranging from 30 to 50, two projects 
involved 20 meetings and the remainder involved more than 10 meetings between investors 
and entrepreneurs. The author asked the platform’s managers to explain why they help set up 
physical interaction between lead investors and entrepreneurs, as commented by one manager: 
“lead investors emphasized that physical meetings were an irreplaceable tool of performing 
due diligence and developing competence and relational trust in entrepreneurs which lead 
investors rely on to make a pledge.” Physical meeting with entrepreneurs was seen effective in 
building trust for making a pledge. Another platform project manager added: “we set up 
physical meetings for investors and entrepreneur since lead investors asked for. If we don’t, 
they would set it up themselves.” 
Lead investors were also asked to explain why they used face-to-face contacts with 
entrepreneurs in their decision processes. As an entrepreneurial investor remarked: “I have to 
meet founding entrepreneurs as I must get a sense of whether the entrepreneur and myself can 
work together for a relatively long term. I also have to figure out the entrepreneur’s capability 
of coping with uncertainty like product demands in market. The only way that I can test all 
these is to interact with him/her.” Another lead investor commented: “information on market 
demands, operational model, key suppliers and entrepreneurs’ ability to deal with uncertainty 
are unobservable. Interacting with the entrepreneur is a way of figuring this out.” The findings 
of this work suggest that lead investors differing from follow-on investors sought for various 
tools of building both competence and relational trust that they rely on to make a pledge.   
Table 3 about here
This research also examined whether previous external finance obtained (e.g., loans or grants) 
was a common trait of successful pledges. However, only 17 firms (13%; n=126 responses) 
had previously obtained external finance before seeking risk capital through AngelCrunch. 
This is unsurprising, given the early-stage at which financing is being sought. The platform’s 
managers were asked for their views on external finance obtained previously, a senior manager 
commented: “lead investors change the criterion weight to assess a venture at different 
development stages. For instance, they pay more attention to actual figures reflecting the 
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potential of fast-growing start-ups that had obtained external finance compared to those in the 
first round of raising funds.” Nevertheless, it is not always the case that firms without prior 
receipt of external finance (e.g., grants, loans, equity) were at a competitive disadvantage of 
gaining a pledge from a lead investor. Interestingly, amongst 15 firms that published details of 
their existing investors, nine firms had obtained VC finance, four firms had obtained finance 
from angels, and two firms had received government grants.  
Follow-on investors and the investment behaviours
Follow-on investors typically invest a small amount of capital in a project/venture, and receive 
a relatively small stake of a company in return (Drover et al., 2017; Block et al., 2017).  They 
are usually non-professionals, and unlikely perform the same level of due diligence as lead 
investors (Vismara, 2018; Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2018). The motivation for follow-on 
investors to invest in start-ups and early-stage firms is to bet on low probability events in the 
hope of gaining a high return. As stated by one follow-on investor: “investing in relatively 
undervalued start-ups and early-stage firms may be a way of enjoying the fastest growing 
economy and becoming super rich. A chance of gaining a high return in the secondary financial 
market becomes small because of the currently overvalued stock.” Although both lead 
investors and follow-on investors share the goal of gaining a high return, they differ in terms 
of the degree and ways of building the competence and relational trust that they rely on to make 
investment decisions. 
The asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and follow-on investors become more 
significant since small and nascent investors are less likely to perform due diligence necessary 
than large and more qualified investors (Ahlers et al., 2015). Follow-on investors thus look for 
additional valuable information to overcome the unobservable quality of a start-up as has been 
described in the literature (Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2018; Vismara, 2018). They based 
initially on inspired lead investors’ pledge to pick up a project to evaluate. As follow-on 
investor commented: “I followed, and was inspired by, several star/lead investors who had 
successfully helped investee firms go for an IPO. I invested my parents’ money in a project 
where the known lead investor made a pledge.”  Another follow-on investor, who by early 
2018 had invested in eight projects with an average of 10,000 CNY in each investment, also 
stated: “I followed a specific lead investor who publish a book on equity crowdfunding. I 
followed his pledges to select projects for due diligence, although I have my preferred 
Page 17 of 38
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijebr





























































International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research
18
industrial sector.” It is a lead investor rather than a project that attract follow-on investors to 
join a crowd for performing due diligence. 
A pledge made by a lead investor serves as a signal enabling follow-on investors to interpret 
information on the entrepreneurs and the venture more positively, or to increase their 
confidence in their interpretation and evaluation of the venture (Moss et al., 2015). This leads 
follow-on investors to become more positive about the quality of a venture and its founding 
entrepreneurs, and allows them to build competence trust despite limited information. As a 
follow-on investor commented: “I read through the online applications carefully but pay 
particular attention to the experience of lead investors. What drove me to make an offer of CNY 
20,000 for a venture was not only the entrepreneur’s energy and commitment but also the 
investment experienced of the lead investor.” The making of a pledge by an established lead 
investor helps to create a more positive social belief in the venture quality and the 
entrepreneur’s capabilities. It assists entrepreneurs in promoting the quality of their venture 
(Vismara, 2016). Follow-on investors sought for more information from different sources like 
pledges of a lead investor and the personal credibility to mitigate uncertainty. According to a 
platform project manager “it becomes easy to get follow-on investors to invest in a project once 
a well-known lead investor has made a pledge.” Follow-on investors’ trust in a lead investor 
to make a right call reassures their gut feel about the entrepreneur and venture in the process 
of reaching their investment decisions. 
The data of this work showed that 103 ECF projects included in our sample (representing 56% 
of the successful campaigns) published the backgrounds of lead investors once they had made 
a pledge. Releasing such valuable information signalled the commitment and expertise of lead 
investors to follow-on investors (Agrawal et al., 2016). It increased the likelihood of obtaining 
funding and led to a better investment outcome, as summarised by a platform project manager: 
“We actively send/publish information about well-known lead investors (e.g. expertise and 
performance history) and their pledged projects to the ECF community. Follow-on investors 
follow the behaviours of well-decorated lead investors.” Our data showed that the platform 
used all media available (i.e., site, office walls, street screens, and others) to make well-
decorated lead investors and their successful investment stories highly visible to the public. For 
those lead investors who had not made their profile public, a platform manager explained that 
they preferred to provide risk capital alone or to co-invest with a small syndicate group of 
networked investors and stay anonymous. It is worth noting that about 25% of the successful 
campaigns received the full amount of capital required from a sole investor. The investor-led 
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model unfortunately prioritised lead investors of investing in a venture over follow-on investors, 
and was responsible for a small size of crowd investors investing a venture. 
Strategic choices of platforms
The analysis suggests early strategic choices for ECF platforms. By adopting an investor-led 
model, the platforms end up reaching a small number of investors interested in a specific start-
up or early-stage firm. The campaign-level evidence, for instance, demonstrates a relatively 
small group of 19 investors was interested in offering ECF in a project with the typical size of 
seven investors. These findings differ from the average number of investors involved in a 
successfully funded project on the UK platforms like Crowdcube and Seedrs, which amounted 
to 92 (Vismara, 2016a). The significant differences in the numbers of investors involved in a 
successful campaign between China and developed countries were partially related to the 
investment behaviour of Chinese VCs and other professionals, and partially a network-based 
approach that remains the key in the informal financial market (Xiao et al., 2013; Burt and 
Batjargal, 2019). As a manager of AngelCrunch explained: “VCs and business angels are keen 
on offering sufficient rather than small amounts of capital required to a firm with the potential 
for fast growth, leaving little space for follow-on investors.” An entrepreneur also stated: “I 
made it clear on my online campaign documents about the maximum number of investors and 
required area of expertise possessed by investors, such as marketing, financial management, 
law, and technologies.” Enabling the lead investors, who are usually VCs and business angels, 
to play a strong role in a campaign allows the funded start-ups to benefit from not only capital 
investment but also business assistances. Consequently, the fundamental notion of 
crowdfunding in generating small amounts of investment capital from a large number of 
investors seems to be challenged in the Chinese context. 
Second, an investor-led model encourages lead investors (e.g. VCs) to gain competitive 
advantages over follow-on investors in not only funding promising projects but also by gaining 
more insightful information about the investee venture at the post-investment stage. The use of 
the lead investor-led model aims to overcome a problem associated with the complexity of 
shareholdings, and to encourage lead investors to provide hands-on support to an investee 
venture, as by the platform’s senior manager explained: “lead investors are responsible for 
providing the needed support and monitoring of investee firms by taking a management fee. 
Investee firms would therefore be able to benefit from the expertise and networks possessed by 
lead investors like traditional angel finance.” However, this brings its own problems, and 
Page 19 of 38
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijebr





























































International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research
20
potentially leaves follow-on investors vulnerable at post-investment stage. As summarised by 
a platform manager: “lead investors who work closely with the venture would gain insightful 
information about an investee firm, and be better prepared to take any actions necessary to 
protect their investment capital particularly in a situation where the investee venture is heading 
for failure.” In addition, within the model, some fundable campaigns might fail to raise 
crowdfunding because of no pledge being made or a pledge being made by a lesser-known 
investor.  
The investor-led model worked well in the earlier stages of the platform’s development where 
early-stage investors were excited and naive about the innovative investment approach and yet 
to experience extreme risk involved and an investment taking years to mature. Since late 2016 
this model has encountered structural challenges, holding back platform fundraising activity 
and requiring adjustments, like all the major ECF platforms in China, experienced major 
strategic changes subsequently. The platform has re-positioned itself to offer intermediation 
services between entrepreneurs and early-stage investors, based on its rich datasets. The 
platform’s current intermediary role serves angel group investors by presenting them with start-
ups with the potential for fast growth, rather than promoting start-ups to a crowd. We have 
explored whether the regulations were responsible for the slowdown of equity crowdfunding 
by asking the platform managers about any changes to regulations. As several managers 
repeatedly remarked: the state government announces new legislations that facilitated ECF 
practices, and local governments provide support ECF platforms (i.e. offices at a lower rate 
and others). According to several platform managers interviewed in 2016 and 2017, the major 
ECF platforms have been transferring to an intermediary linking early-stage angel investors to 
entrepreneurs of start-ups after five years of operation. The main reason for the transformation 
given by a platform manager was: “follow-on investors are left particularly vulnerable. The 
investor-led model helps lead investors to build trust with entrepreneurs, but fails to create 
mechanisms to protect follow-on investors from undue risk.” A poor performance of early 
investments made on the platform was another reason for the slowdown, as a platform manager 
commented: “only a very small proportion of firms who obtained ECF were able to offer a 
good return several years after receiving crowdfunding. Angel investors become less motivated 
to provide funding to early-stage ventures through ECF.” The shift from a large number of 
crowd investors to several co-investors demonstrates that ECF platforms are moving towards 
an online variant of a more syndication (Mason and Harrison, 2015). Such shift could be 
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partially related to the business development path, and partially to slowdown in GDP growth 
in China.
Discussion 
This study explores how lead investors build interpersonal trust in the entrepreneur for making 
an early pledge in the specific context of a campaign. This work contributes to the 
entrepreneurial finance and crowdfunding literature in several aspects. First, it provides 
insights into the process of building trust for decision-making in related to both lead and follow-
on investors. Prior studies on signalling information have investigated what drives the success 
of equity crowdfunding campaigns without examining lead and follow-on investors’ 
determinants separately (Block et al., 2018; Bernstein et al., 2017; Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 
2016). The findings of this study show that lead investors are not only VCs and experienced 
angels but also established companies and experienced entrepreneurs. As is the case with angel 
investing activity and syndicated deals, lead investors who make an early pledge of at least of 
30% of the risk capital required, and monitor the investee firms on behalf of other investors 
(Agrawal et al., 2016). In contrast, follow-on investors are allowed to invest a small amount of 
capital in a start-up. Consequently, lead investor’s process of building trust in the entrepreneur 
differs from that of follow-on investors. Lead investors start by working on selective signalling 
information published online and establish competence trust in the founding entrepreneurs for 
selecting ventures for due diligence. The selective information (e.g., reputations of the 
universities at which founding entrepreneurs/teams have studied) offers a fundamental basis 
upon which lead investors can figure out the changing job costs and reputation costs, 
operational skills and relevant expertise, all of which contribute to competence trust building 
(Bernstein et al., 2017; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Wilson and Martin, 2015). As one 
interviewed lead investor stated: “I am investing in people who are key to business success, 
and have to meet them before offering a relatively sufficient amount of capital, and signalling 
a good call to follow-on investors.” Our analysis of the empirical evidence suggests that lead 
investors then rely on physical interaction with an entrepreneur as a useful tool of performing 
due diligence for building competence and relational trust. Physical interaction is a useful tool 
for lead investors to work out unobservable information for building competence trust to 
mitigate uncertainty identified. It also establishes a sense of cooperation between lead investors 
and the founding entrepreneurs. 
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In contrast, follow-on investors are usually amateurs, and typically have limited resources and 
lack expertise to evaluate an investment opportunity and monitor the investee firm at the post-
investment stage. They thus do not perform the same level of due diligence as lead investors. 
Our in-depth evidence suggests that some follow-on investors base on the pledge of lead 
invest rs with the positive perception to select projects for performing due diligence. They then 
look for information published on the venture and entrepreneur together with the judgements 
from other investors (e.g. the presumed wisdom of a crowd) to develop their confidence of 
making the final decisions. A pledge of knowledgeable lead investors seems to increase follow-
on investors’ confidence of rationally making their investment decisions (Barsade, 2002). 
However, simply herding after a lead investor limits follow-on investors’ interactions with the 
lead investor, and discourages to build extensive relations between them for further cooperation.
Second, prior studies, building on a signalling theory, have entirely studied the determinants 
of campaign success and outcomes, (Block et al., 2018; Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016). 
This research takes one-step further by demonstrating the importance of trust in the crowd who 
are glued to a campaign. Agrawal et al., (2013) indicate that the direct transfer of information 
to investors is hampered by moral hazard, which in turn can hamper the investment process, 
but crowdfunding reduces information asymmetry. This work shows that investors glued to a 
campaign transfer information amongst them to reduce information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs and investors. More importantly, this work uncover that a lead investor’s 
behaviour (e.g. physical interaction and the making of a pledge) together with his/her record of 
accomplishment are used to compensate for less thorough due diligence that small and nascent 
investors can perform. Transferring additional and valuable information amongst the investors 
is critical to build interpersonal trust for managing an early-stage investment in the virtual 
world alone. 
Finally, another contribution of this work is methodological. Current literature on ECF is 
dominated by quantitative studies, and based primarily on the information recorded in the 
platform (Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2018; Vismara 2018), with a few of exception (Brown et 
al., 2019). This study conducts a three-year inductive field study of Chinese ECF, and gathers 
both campaign and platform-level data from multiple sources. This research therefore provides 
insights onto the unobservable decision-making processes of crowdfunding investors. We 
capture the role of events organised and efforts made by the singular in supplementing the 
selective information disseminated by start-ups/young ventures to early-stage investors. 
Moreover, prior work on crowdfunding has generally used the selective information about a 
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start-up’s quality to test the likelihood of campaign success (Cholakova and Clarysee, 2015), 
disregarding the differences in investment behaviour between lead and follow-on investors and 
the additional activities conducted by investors. By gathering in-depth data, we provide early 
insights into the role of platforms in facilitating the process of trust building for campaign 
fundraising (McKenny et al., 2017). 
Limitations of current research and avenues for future research
In common with previous research, this study is constrained by the datasets available. This 
work was only able to gather data on completed deals rather than the entire pool of early-
stage firms to have received a pledge or the entire pool of early-stage firms considered by 
lead investors. The sample does not allow for the examination of unsuccessful campaigns, 
their characteristics of selective information of founding entrepreneurs, and the role of a lead 
investor. This work only managed to gather data about the identity of the lead investors, with 
limited information about the follow-on investors. Future research could collect data on all of 
the campaigns considered by lead investors, and test the role of competence and relational 
trust in making a pledge. Although our data cover a period of seven years from the platform 
establishment (2011) to the current period of study (January 2018), this work is limited by the 
size and scale of in-depth interviews and first-hand observations. Future research could 
explore the role of the interactions between lead and follow-on investors in arriving at follow-
on decisions. 
This work has focused on one specific platform in China, which experienced rapid growth and 
then a slowdown since its establishment in 2011. Our findings suggest that an investor-led 
model encourages lead investors to engage heavily with entrepreneurs to build both the 
competence and relational trust that they rely on to make a pledge. This supports the view that 
the virtual world alone has its limitations in building such trust that lead investors rely on to 
arrive at investment decisions (Le Gall and Langley, 2015). A similar study undertaken in other 
countries could provide a better understanding of the extent to which ECF investors rely on 
both competence and relational trust to make their pledges, which may vary according to the 
institutional setting (Bruton et al., 2015). Signalling selective information about a lead investor 
and a pledge helps to create a more positive belief in the entrepreneur’s capabilities and the 
quality of the start-up idea, helping follow-on investors to interpret information more positively. 
Interestingly, AngelCrunch’s investor-led model shifts from focusing on a large number of 
crowd investors to serving a small group of co-investors for an investment opportunity. Is the 
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fundamental notion of ECF in raising a small amount of capital from a large number of crowd 
investors sustainable? Future studies may continue to examine how the trust role fits into the 
context of ECF by focusing on more ECF platforms located in China and in other countries, 
and on the role of the platforms in influencing the likelihood of campaign success.  
Practical implications
In addition to contributing to literature on entrepreneurial finance and trust theory, this study 
has implications for platforms, investors, and policy makers. First, the findings of this study 
demonstrate that understanding the importance of trust in the crowd might help platforms to 
manage the campaign process more effectively. Recognising the strong role of lead investors’ 
perceptions and attributions in the decision-making process might help platforms to engage 
with both lead and follow-on investors more efficiently. Knowing the embedded problems 
related to the much smaller number of investors involving in and investing in a project might 
help platforms to make strategic choices for attracting follow-on investors. Second, this work 
highlights the limitations of the virtual world alone to build such trust and manage problems 
associated with information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors in the context of 
a campaign. Using a mix of virtual and traditional methods of building such trust works for 
lead investors, but might change the approach from equity crowdfunding to syndication. 
Finally, policy makers should be award of the strong role of trust in the investment decisions, 
and build a framework where platform, investors and start-ups are encouraged to share more 
valuable information online for trust building. 
Conclusions
This study offers early insights into competence trust and relational trust building on which 
early-stage lead investors rely to arrive at investment decisions, as well as early insights into 
the follow-on investors’ decisions being the influence by the behaviour and reputation of a lead 
investor. The selective and formative information about founding entrepreneurs and the start-
up idea enables lead investors to build initial competence trust for their screening decisions, 
but has its limitations in terms of developing competence and relational trust that they rely on 
to make a pledge. Physical interactions between entrepreneurs and lead investors help to 
perform due diligence through which both competence and relational trust are built. Second, 
for early-stage follow-on investors, most of whom are not professional, their perception of a 
lead investor and his/her pledges together with the selective and formative information 
published online determine their investment decisions. Managers of ECF platforms could help 
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early-stage lead investors, who are yet to make successful investments, develop their public 
profiles on the platform. As the ECF platform evolves, it may be strategically wise to offer 
intermediary services to assist lead investors and co-investors, rather than making promising 
business offerings to a large number of early-stage investors.  
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Figure 1: Overview of data collection 
 
Hand-collected data online
-189 successful online campaigns 
from AngelCrunch site 
-amongst these, information on 
entrepreneurs and businesses found 
on 89 firms’ sites
Archival documents
-Annual reports on the largest 
equity platforms 
-Quarterly reports by AngelCrunch 
Informal interviews with
Senior manager of AngelCrunch (3) 
author of the annual reports (1)
On-site observations of 
-Offline speed-dating, pitches, responses 
by investors, meetings between platform 
managers and entrepreneurs, meetings 
between platform managers and 
investors
-Communications between platform 
managers and entrepreneurs, and 
between platform managers and 
selected investors  





Note: some participants provided more 
than one interviews, the number of 
interviews was greater than the number 
of interviewees.
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Figure 2: AngelCrunch fundraising operation process 
Step 5
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Sources: developed by Xiao based on the in-depth information collected  
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Firms failed 
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Figure 3: Process model of lead and follow-on investors’ trust 
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Figure 1: AngelCrunch fundraising operation process 
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Figure 3: Process model of lead and follow-on investor trust 
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Table 1 Growth and development of AngelCrunch from 2011 to 2015 
Year Project 
applications 




Amount of risk capital raised (million 
CNY)*
No No % No %
2013 6456 1097 17% 65 5.9% d/k
2014 8410 2607 31% 77 3.0% 769
From 2011 to August 
2015 
16090 4928 31% 230 1.4% 1003
Developed by the author based on the sources from IT JUZi and AngelCrunch
*Note: Exchange rate is about 1.00GBP=9.79878CNY on 23rd June 2015
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Table 2 Project distribution by industry sector and business model
Platform B2B 
B2C 
Online business Apps Traditional 
business 
Total (Col.%)
Software and database 11 18 15 44 (24%)
Leisure 27 11 38 (21%)
Healthcare 10 2 12 (7%)
Education and career 20 6 1 27 (15%)
Food 12 3 2 17 (9%)
Law 6 1 7 (4%)
Others 28 10 38 (21%)
Total 114 51 15 3 183 (100%)
Source: AngelCrunch
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Table 3 Illustration of competence and relational trust and pledge
Trust Lead investors Platform managers
Competence  “I liked the business idea, and the entrepreneur’s passion about 
the business. That was great. However, I had to figure out 
whether he has the capability of dealing with uncertainty 
because of full of uncertainty ahead. Asking similar questions at 
different points in time helped me test his capability.”
“I believe that the only way f mitigating risk was to make sure 
that the entrepreneur was the right person for the job. 
Interacting with him helped me develop my gut feel about his 
ability to succeed the business.”   
“We made arrangements for lead investors to meet entrepreneurs 
regularly. We know that lead investors will not be able to make a pledge 
without trust in entrepreneurs’ ability to run the business. Given that 
early-stage ventures being assessed, it lacks of observable information.” 
Relational “I should be able to have my confidence about the entrepreneur 
whom I can work with not only now but also in the future. My 
experience of investing in early-stage ventures told me that 
sharing views and value is important otherwise it could cause 
problems at the post-investment stage. ”  
“I actually invest in the entrepreneur rather than the venture 
because things around the business kept on changes. I walked 
away from a promising project since I found the entrepreneur 
was quite self-centred.”
“Lead investors are typically professional and experienced investors. They 
know the importance of working with business partners that are right for 
them. There were some cases, the lead investors were interested in at 
the early stage, but they did not make a pledge at the final stage. In one 
case, the lead investor told us that it was not easy to communicate with 
the entrepreneur.”   
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